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THE ART OF CONDUCT,THE CONDUCTOF ART AND THE 'MIXED
SCIBNCE'OF ELIOT'S ETHICS: 'SYMPATHETICIMPULSE'AND 'THE
SCIBNTIFICPOINT OF VIBW' IN THE MILL ON THE FWSS
By Simon Calder
The Mill on the Floss is full of keys and clues. Most famously, Maggie Tolliver, following her
father's bankruptcy, 'wanted some key that would enable her to understand and, in
understanding, endure, the heavy weight that had fallen on her young heart.' 1 In chapter three
of Book Four of Eliot's novel, Maggie believes herself to have found just such a key in Thomas
aKempis's The Imitation of Christ (MF, 298):

Here, then, was a secret of life that would enable her to renounce all other
secrets ... [F]or the first time she saw the possibility of shifting the position
from which she looked at the gratification of her own desires, of taking her
stand out of herself, and looking at her own life as an insignificant part of a
divinely guided whole. (302)
George Eliot was, of course, highly suspicious of the endeavour to discover master keys:2
opposed to Casaubon's search for the Key to all Mythologies, she could hardly have wholly
supported Maggie's belief in a Kempisian key to existence. In the final chapter of Book Six
however, it becomes clear that Maggie has discovered something in Kempis. What she has
actually found, suggests Eliot's narrator, is not a key but a 'clue'. In the following quotation
from 'Waking', we find Maggie engaged in a process of discovery: 'soon the whole terrible
truth urged itself upon her' (491). Maggie is shown to be coming to know that to rend such
'ties' as give 'meaning' to 'duty' is irrevocably 'wrong';
Her life with Stephen could have no sacredness: she must for ever sink and
wander vaguely, driven by uncertain impulse;for she had let go the clue of life
- that clue which once in the far off years her young need had clutched so
strongly. (491; my italics)
I want to suggest that Eliot's account of Maggie's development itself includes some crucial
clues to her own ideas about the symbiotic relation between ethics (the art of conduct),
aesthetics (the conduct of art) and epistemology (the art or science of coming to know). In The
Mill on the Floss, Maggie's initial response to The Imitation of Christ is not entirely separable
from her later discovery that she is just one 'part' of a more complex 'whole', which includes
both Philip and Lucy. In turn, Maggie's aesthetic response to Kempis and her epistemological
discovery (of the 'terrible truth') are deeply related to her ethical decision, to return home. My
reason for applying these philosophical terms to Eliot's fiction is to highlight how different her
perspective is from those of some of the figures with whom she is regularly associated. As
Martha Vogeler highlighted in a Special 'George Eliot' Issue of Nineteenth Century Fiction
published in 1980, positivists like Frederic Harrison staunchly believed that ethics, aesthetics
and epistemology ought first to be clearly separated, before being set back together again:
Just as Positivist philosophy established the [epistemologically] True, and
Positive polity defined the [ethically] Good, so Positivist art should present the
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[aesthetically] Beautiful.3
When, to quote Bernard Paris, '[George Eliot] wrote to Frederic Harrison of having "gone
through again the severe effort of trying to make certain ideas thoroughly incarnate, as if they
had revealed themselves to me first in the flesh and not in the spirit"' ,4 she was blurring the
boundaries between thought, right action and creativity in much the same manner as she does
in The Mill on the Floss. Paris's compelling account of 'Eliot's use of the novel as an
instrument of moral education' does not seem sufficiently alive to the significance of this
blurring, however (Paris, 121). Paris's central idea - in Experiments in Life - was that Eliot saw
'the vivid representation of human experience as a far more effective means of moral education
than theories, sermons and tracts' (124). According to this theory, Eliot only appears to
reconcile Realism (epistemology) and Moralism (ethics) because she had a more 'vivid'
aesthetic than the 'other positivists' (242-250, 3). Paris assumes that Eliot had the same
purpose as Harrison and Comte, and that she therefore aimed to motivate ethical action
realistically (i.e., in a deterministic world), by initiating certain, philosopltj.cally-endorsed
moral 'causes'. The Mill on the Floss provides many interesting clues as to how Eliot's position
is far more complex than Paris's account of it suggests .. ·

'"·

Before suggesting how Eliot's novel troubles some of the notions about moral development
with which her fiction is often associated, I want to draw attention to a notebook that Eliot
composed in the late 1870s. This notebook - which opens with epigrams from both Aristotle
and Mill and contains an entry on 'Moral Freedom' - is the closest thing that we have to a Key
to Eliot's philosophical attitude. Here is what Eliot writes about 'right action':
A great deal of 'right action' is sure to be done - as sure as the begetting of
children - if human society continues; & to be done for sympathetic impulses.
Why have multitudes of mankind been tender to their mothers, waited on the
sick ... - & so on? Not because they were contemplating the greatest happiness
of the greatest number of mankind - or their own achievement of utmost
possible excellence - or their own happiness here or hereafter. 5
Rather than provoking the question 'what, then, were these people contemplating?', Eliot's
passage implies that there is no sure connection between contemplation (i.e., theory or
philosophy) and ethical activity. Eliot suggests that the kinds of 'right action' that concern her
could not have been motivated by utilitarian calculations about 'the greatest happiness of the
greatest number', by positivistic aspirations after the 'utmost positive excellence', by
eudaemonistic ideas about achieving 'happiness here' or by theological theories about
achieving it 'hereafter'. Eliot suggests that 'right action' depends not upon 'contemplation' but
upon 'sympathetic impulses'.
It may come as somewhat of a surprise, therefore, that in the paragraph directly pre.ceding that
on 'sympathetic impulses', Eliot encourages us to 'consider ethics' from a 'scientific point of
view'. This is how she opens the first original entry in her notebook:
Ethics is a mixed science to which conduct is the corresponding art. From the
scientific point of view you have to consider the forms of force or energy
concerned & how they are generated & what changes they will beget directly
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& incidentally. Hence it seems an unfruitful attempt now to consider ethics
apart from social & psychological evolution. ('ML', 364)

Should we theorize or shouldn't we? The first two paragraphs of Eliot's notebook appear to
present conflicting views: whereas the first suggests that we ought to think about ethics from
a 'scientific point of view', the second suggests that 'right action' only evolves from
'sympathetic impulses' (so the less we theorize the better, surely?). This conflict between
sympathetic impulse and the scientific point of view is, I think, also embodied in Eliot's wellknown declaration that her novels are 'experiments in life'.
This is how Eliot theorized her own artistic conduct to Dr Joseph Frank Payne in a letter
composed on 25 January 1876:
My writing is simply a set of experiments in life - an endeavour to see what
our thought and emotion may be capable of - what stores of motive, actual or
hinted as possible, give promise of a better after which we may strive - what
gains from past revelations and discipline we must strive to keep hold of as
something more sure than shifting theory.6
Contra Eliot, there is nothing simple about this statement, which - like her writing on Ethics seems to point in two separate directions. Eliot claims that her writings are 'experiments': this
draws attention to the continuity between her own work and that of Auguste Comte and John
Stuart Mill,7 both of whom prescribed rules for experimental conduct, in the Cours de
philosophie positive (1830-42) and A System of Logic (1843) respectively. Some salient aspects
of Eliot's account point in a decidedly different direction however, very much away from
Comte and Mill: whereas these philosophers were each essentially concerned with creating a
scientific 'Organon of Discovery' ,8 Eliot concludes her sentence by suggesting that 'we must
strive to keep hold of ["stores of motive"] as something more sure than shifting theory.' Eliot's
reflections on her own creative conduct then continue in this vein:
I become more and more timid - with less daring to adopt any formula that
does not get itself clothed for me in some human figure and individual
experience, and perhaps that is a sign that if I help others to see at all it must
be through the medium of art. (GEL VI, 216-217)
Once again, this statement betrays a blurring of philosophical boundaries to which I think
Paris's theorization ofEliot's 'experiments' is insufficiently alive: Eliot does not perceive 'Art'
a la Comte and Harrison, as a means of inculcating motives that Positivist polity has deemed
Good because Positivist philosophy declares it to be True that they lead to right action.
Although I hope to highlight some previously unrecognized ways in which The Mill on the
Floss engages with Comte and Mill, I believe that Paris was unwise to assume that the motives
that governed Eliot's conduct as a moralist and the results that she hoped to elicit as an artist
were fundamentally similar to the motives that inspired and the results that were sought by
these philosophers.
I have suggested that a conflict between 'sympathetic impulse' and 'the scientific point of
view' exists at the heart ofEliot's art, and that this same conflict is embodied in her theoretical
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reflections both on ethics and her own artistic conduct. The third paragraph of Eliot's notebook
on ethical subjects, subtitled 'Feeling is a sort of knowledge', contains a clue as to how this
conflict might be controlled:
What seems eminently wanted is a closer comparison between the knowledge
which we call rational & the experience which we call emotional. ('ML', 364)

If 'Feeling is a sort of Knowledge', then the kind of (aesthetic) experience that one acquires
through art may inculcate not just (ethical) action but also a different 'sort of Knowledge' than
that which scientists and philosophers may acquire by Comtean or Millean means. Consider
again Maggie Tulliver, whose ultimate recognition of the 'truth' about 'this hard, real life', in
Book Six of The Mill on the Floss, is traceable to a 'sudden vision' in Book Four (MF, 491,
298,302). Although there is nothing analogous to this notion of gaining 'from past revelations'
in Comte or Mill's writings on knowledge-acquisition, there is a remarkable affinity between
Eliot's (feeling-saturated) thought and that of the modern moral philosopher Martha
Nussbaum. I here quote the passage from Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and
Literature that I believe to be most pertinent to our effort to appreciate Eliot's thought on the
conduct of art and art of conduct:
[O]ne of the things that makes literature something deeper and more central
than a complex game ... [is that it] speaks about us, about our lives and choices
and emotions, about our social existence and the totality of our connections. As
Aristotle observed, it is deep, and conducive to our inquiry about how to live,
because it. .. searches for patterns of possibility - of choice, and circumstance,
and the interaction between choice and circumstance - that tum up in human
lives with such persistence that they must be regarded as our possibilities. And
so our interest in literature becomes ... cognitive: an interest in finding out...
what possibilities (and tragic impossibilities) life offers to us, what hopes and
fears for ourselves it underwrites or subverts.9
Like Eliot, Nussbaum believes that literature can conduct important epistemic work in a sphere
within which traditional philosophic and scientific practices cannot elicit adequate findings, a
sphere in which the object of interest is 'life' and the 'possibilities' it offers us. As Suzy Anger
observes in The Cambridge Companion to George Eliot, 'George Eliot made similar claims' to
Martha Nussbaum, to the effect that 'some ethical truths are presentable oply in the form of
narrative, which can illustrate the complexities, particularities, and nuances of life, in ways
which abstract philosophical treatments of ethics are incapable of doing' .10 Important avenues
remain to be explored between Eliot and Nussbaum's thought, the chief of which concerns an
affinity between Nussbaum's neo-Aristotelian picture of 'choice' - 'as an ability that lies on
the borderline between the intellectual and the passional' - and Eliot's call for 'closer
comparison between the knowledge which we call rational & the experience which we call
emotional' (LK, 78; 'ML', 364).
However, if Nussbaum contributes something towards our appreciation of Eliot then it is not a
key but a clue. Indeed, there are various reasons why Nussbaum's neo-Aristotelian theory of
the conduct of art fails to fit with the texture of Eliot's experimental fiction, as Nussbaum
herself was the first to highlight when she dismissed George Eliot's novels as '[in]appropriate'

63

objects of interest in her Introduction to Love's Knowledge (45). Nussbaum's work ultimately
shows (to appropriate her own assessment of Eliot) that the 'posture of George Eliot's narrator'
projects a very different picture of 'our human position' (indeed, a more 'scientific' one) than
that which any self-defining neo-Aristotelian is likely to welcome (45). From the perspective
of eudaemonist theorists (who essentially believe that 'contemplating ... [our] happiness here',
however broadly one interprets this, is the Key to increasing 'right action'), Eliot's fiction is
likely to cause more trouble than it's worth. Nussbaum does afford us a clue though, that 'our
interest in literature' may be 'cognitive'; recognizing how this supports Nussbaum's general
claim that 'style' is 'an integral part ... of the search for and the statement of truth', I want to
suggest that Eliot's fiction directs us towards a different sort of knowledge than conventional
philosophical and scientific methods are able to elicit (LK, 3). With this anticipative idea in
mind, let's return to The Mill on the Floss and see where it gets us.

Like his sister Maggie, Tom Tulliver engages in a number of attempts to understand and, in
understanding, endure this hard, real life. Although 'life had not presented itself to him as a
difficult problem' at Mr Jacobs's Academy, after a fortnight at King's Lorton it seemed 'that
life, complicated not only with the Latin grammar but with a new standard of English
pronunciation, was a very difficult business' (MF, 140-141). As Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth has
noted, the 'only time [that] Tom begins to develop a sense of alternatives, and hence of the
questionable value of his customary ways and familial "rights", is at Stelling's school, where
the different "standard of things" domestic and personal acts like a difference of native
language, casting his whole moral vocabulary into question' (Ermarth, 82). Focusing on 'Tom's
"First Half", I want to consider the significance of the fact that, though both Tom and Maggie
are bewildered by Stelling, Eliot makes no suggestion that these children could or should be
converted from a bad track to a better one by means of systematic education.
Both Comte and Mill had some highly developed ideas about the proper nature and telos of
education, conceptions that were alien to those that I hope to unearth from Eliot's fiction.
Throughout the remainder of this article, I shall relate some salient features of Eliot's account
of Tom and Maggie's schooling to Comte and Mill's theories of education, not because I think
that Eliot adopted their theories, but for the Nussbaumian reason that we 'grasp by contrasting'
(LK, 190). However, whereas Nussbaum believes that we may 'grasp' the fact 'that all novels
share certain [neo-Aristotelian] ethical commitments' through contrasting novels with works of
philosophy, I suggest that the picture of life that emerges from Eliot's fiction contrasts both
with Nussbaum's neo-Aristotelian conception and with the pictures of life conveyed by Comte
and Mill (190).
One of the strongest pieces of evidence that Eliot continued to engage with Comtean theory
throughout her fiction-writing career is her celebration, in the aforementioned notebook, of
Comte's Key distinction 'between the Static & Dynamic - between what is an inherent quality
or characteristic or need of the human being (i.e. the social man who is alone really human), &
what is modifiable or doomed to disappear under successive changes' ('ML', 372). Comte
believed that by methodical experimentation certain 'static' qualities of the human mind might
become known, and that a positivistic education system might thus be deduced from this data.
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Indeed, in the Cours de philosophie positive Comte asserted that the 'establishment' of a final,
positivistic stage of human development would necessitate a 'general recasting' of the
European 'educational system': 11
Competent judges are already unanimous in recognizing the necessity of replacing
our European education, which is still essentially theological, metaphysical, and
literary, by a positive education in accordance with the spirit of our time and adapted
to the needs of modem civilization. (Comte, 24)
There is clearly a considerable clash between Comte's mono-linear explanation of the way in
which all human minds develop, through three successive stages - theological, metaphysical
and positivistic - and Eliot's depiction of Maggie's move away from both fiction (contra Philip)
and 'masculine wisdom' (contra Mr Stelling and Tom) to Thomas a Kempis's theological
perspective (or to the Feuerbachian humanism towards which Eliot's presentation ofMaggie's
development points). What is the significance of this radical discrepancy between Comte's
sense of ideal human development and Eliot's presentation of Maggie's actual progress?
When Maggie visits King's Lorton and first encounters the Latin language, she does not
attempt to discover the meaning of phrases inductively, but skips to an 'English Key' at the end
of the Grammar book. (155). From a Comtean perspective, Maggie's yearning for Keys (first,
this Key to the Grammar Book, and later that Kempisian master key) reveal her essential
inaptitude for a properly positivistic education: she is too often distracted by 'absorbing'
particulars to develop her understanding of the lawful relations between such details. Maggie so it seems - never acquires understanding, since she 'skip[s] the rules in the Syntax' (155).
The full force ofMaggie's alleged error, as seen from the perspective of a positivistic educatortheorist, can only be fully appreciated in light of Comte's elaborately hierarchical model of the
system of positive sciences. To briefly characterize that system, Comte held that every positive
science ought to occupy a given place within a scale ascending from astronomy (which
'considers the most general, simple, and abstract phenomena') to sociology (which considers
'the most special, complicated, and concrete') (Comte, 57). Although Comte recognized that
the objects studied by mathematicians and astronomers (i.e., at the 'abstract' end of the
spectrum) appear to be 'remote from human interests', he held that such laws as may be
discovered through studying 'abstract' phenomena must inevitably also determine the concrete
phenomena studied in the complex (and more immediately interesting) sciences (57). As such,
it is only by first recognizing abstract truths about simple laws that positivistic inquirers may
later proceed to acquire positive knowledge about •concrete' objects: this theory would suggest
that through failing to master something so admittedly abstract as the laws of Latin Syntax,
Maggie excludes herself from understanding all that is nearest and dearest to her (here, her
brother, Mr Stelling, and the words on the page).
Interestingly, despite her own assertion that Eliot had limited interest in positivism,12 Elizabeth
Deeds Ermarth lays just this kind of charge upon both of the Tulliver children:
Neither Tom nor Maggie learns enough about the syntax of things, or about the
difference between one syntax and another, to overcome their earliest lessons
about exclusiveness, obedience, and passivity. (Ermarth, 82)
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I want to suggest that a readership conversant with Comte's hierarchical structure of the
sciences would have been alive to the fact that the clash between Maggie 's mode of living and
that of the implied ideal learner works in two directions. Eliot's narrative does not invite us to
be one-sidedly critical of Maggie's particularism. Indeed, the narrator too draws our attention
towards an example that both Maggie and I find particularly interesting:
The astronomer who hated women generally caused her so much puzzling
speculation that she one day asked Mr Stelling if all astronomers hated women,
or whether it was only this particular astronomer. But forestalling his answer,
she said, 'I suppose it's all astronomers: because you know, they live up in high
towers, and if the women came there, they might talk and hinder them from
looking at the stars.' (MF, 158)
Maggie may skip the rules in the Syntax; nevertheless, she directly intuits the clue (this
misogynistic astronomer) to Eliot's critique of Comte. As much as Maggie's unsystematic
approach to Grammar is implicitly criticized by both Eliot's narrator and Tom, Maggie's
attitude towards the astronomer simultaneously challenges Comte's assumption that one can
only acquire real knowledge through first becoming adept at handling abstractions. In all its
concrete specificity, Maggie's favourite example is remarkably salient, for in Comte's
conception the astronomer's own heuristic, of radical abstraction, is the anti-type to Maggie's
particularism. Neither Maggie nor her astronomer escapes from Eliot's irony, however: if
Tom's derision of Maggie emphasizes her inaptitude for 'masculine wisdom', then Maggie's
puzzlement at the astronomer highlights his inaptitude for life, which is - after all - that which
Eliot's fiction studies. Maggie's hypothetical astronomer prioritizes planets over people: this
fact about his conduct (a fact elicited by both Maggie's intuition and Eliot's art) appears to belie
his pretension to exemplarity. Insofar as Eliot's narrator presents Maggie's own way of living
sympathetically meanwhile, then Eliot's fiction directly challenges the value-judgements on
which Comte's positive polity was founded. In a manner that deeply troubles Paris's theory of
Eliot's thought and fiction, The Mill on the Floss makes us question whether it is always better
to be and to think like a positivist than to be and to think theologically or metaphysically, like
Maggie Tulliver.
For a number of reasons, one expects to discover a closer affinity between Eliot and Mill than
between Eliot and Comte. First, in her essay of 1855, on 'The Future of German Philosophy',
Eliot responds to Professor Gruppe's misapprehension of Mill's System with a forceful defence
of his account of the relation between 'Deduction' and 'experiment':
Deduction, Mill shows, is not properly opposed to induction but to experiment,
and is a means of registering and using the results of induction, indispensable
to any great progress in science.13
Second, Mill paralleled Eliot in recognizing how Comte's refusal to accept Psychology as a
positive science was 'the parent of serious errors in his attempt to create a Social Science'
('ACP', 298). Eliot's 1870s notebook tellingly opens with an epigraph from 'Mill's Logic'
concerning 'the necessity of an experimental study' of 'mental phenomena':
The generation of one class of mental phenomena from another, whenever it
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can be made out, is a highly interesting fact in psychological chemistry; but it
no more supersedes the necessity of an experimental study of the generated
phenomena, than a knowledge of the properties of oxygen & sulphur enables
us to deduce those of sulphuric acid without specific observation &
experiment. - Mill's Logic ii. 637 14
To interrelate Eliot's two nuggets of Millean wisdom, Deduction is indispensable to any great
progress in science, and yet inadvisable when uninformed by specific observation and
experiment. This is the basis on with Mill grounds his theory of education: Education, for Mill,
is the 'art' that corresponds to the Deductive Science 'Ethology', where Ethology or 'the
Science of Character' is 'a system of corollaries from [the Experimental Science] Psychology'
(ASL, 869). 15 Mill hoped that by studying 'the origin and sources of all those qualities in human
beings which are interesting to us, either as facts to be produced, to be avoided, or merely to
be understood', Ethologists might unearth ample data regarding the interplay between
psychological and material laws and that from this data theorists might deduce a broad range
of educatory systems, each designed to cultivate a different type of nature (ASL, 873).
There is a third reason why one might expect Eliot's ideas to parallel Mill's, and this is that
Mill's own aversion to illiberally imposing a prescribed educatory system upon the populace
was based on his intuition that the public might effectively be treated as amateur Ethologists.
Here is the famous quotation from Chapter Three of On Liberty - published five years before
Eliot composed her letter to Dr Joseph Frank Payne - in which Mill suggests that political
authorities ought to promote 'experiments of living':
As it is useful that while mankind are imperfect there should be different
opinions, so is it that there should be different experiments of living; that free
scope should be given to varieties of character, short of injury to others; and
that the worth of different modes of life should be proved practically, when any
one thinks fit to try them. 16
Are Eliot's novels Millean exercises in Ethology? Our account of Eliot's testing of both
Maggie's and the astronomer's modes of life would certainly support this theory. Considering
Eliot's depiction of Tom's return home from King's Lorton however, I want to suggest that
there are considerable differences between the epistemic endeavour conducted and provoked
by Eliot's experimental conduct and the attitude prescribed by Mill. In the following passage,
Eliot considers Tom's affective attachment to the 'ugly' furniture of his childhood home:
Very commonplace, very ugly, that furniture of our early home might look if it
were put up to auction; an improved taste in upholstery scorns it; and is not the
striving after something better in our surroundings, the grand characteristic that
distinguishes man from the brute - or, to satisfy a scrupulous accuracy of
definition, that distinguishes the British man from the foreign brute? (MF, 160)
With her claim that this distinction (between 'the British man and the foreign brute') is
scrupulously accurate, Eliot appears to ironize the 'science' of Ethology: the attempt to theorize
about human societies is always conducted from somewhere and by someone, implicitly - in
this case - by a 'British man', with his own scientistic and national prejudices. 'Tom's "First
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Half" also presents a very serious challenge to Mill's moral-philosophical assumptions.
Whereas Mill suggested that all maxim-making ought to be governed by the principle of utility
and that useful precepts might thus be deduced from ethological laws concerning variations in
happiness,17 Eliot recognizes that actual 'preferences' like Tom's are bound to appear
'unjustifiable' to 'to any of those severely regulated minds who are free from the weakness of
any attachment that does not rest on a demonstrable superiority of qualities' (MF, 160).
I have suggested that Eliot's fiction embodies strong suspicions about the possibility, and even
stronger suspicions about the virtue, of perching a system of ethics atop the edifice of
scientifically-authorized knowledge. She explicitly highlights that British philosophers may
have habitually striven 'after something better' in accordance with logical principles;
But heaven knows where that striving might lead us if our affections had not a
trick of twining round ... old inferior things, if the loves and sanctities of our
life had no deep immovable roots in memory (MF, 160).
Eliot's art ultimately challenges Mill's philosophical theory, insofar as that theory is based on
a highly intellectualized and non-revisable conception of what man is or ought to be. Returning
to the third chapter of On Liberty, Mill seems reluctant to question a very particular set of ideas
about what the 'human' faculties are (or will be when fully realized):
He who chooses his plan for himself, employs all his faculties. He must use
observation to see, reasoning and judgment to foresee, activity to gather
materials for decision, discrimination to decide, and when he has decided,
firmness and self-control to hold to his deliberate decision. And these qualities
he requires and exercises exactly in proportion as the part of his conduct which
he determines according to his own judgment and feelings is a large one (OL,
67-68).
According to Mill, the ideal moral agent is the man who is able to utilize adequate methods of
investigation so as to elicit his own theory of the Good, and then live by it. This ideal agent is
exemplary by virtue of demonstrating the following attributes or 'qualities': 'observation',
'reasoning', 'judgment', 'activity', 'discrimination', 'firmness' and 'self-control' (67). These
are clearly not qualities with which Tom is well-endowed when he first arrives at King's
Lorton, and this is largely why his 'sufferings' there are so 'severe' (MF, 140). Tom is
inobservant, insofar as he remains 'in a state of blank unimaginativeness concerning the cause
and tendency of his sufferings', irrational and unoriginal, insofar as he doesn't engage in
experiments in life ('not [being] given to hypothesis and experiment') and indiscriminate,
insofar as he tries to acquire Mr. Stelling's 'approbation' at all costs (148-149). Indeed,
Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth convincingly contrasts both Maggie's and Tom's 'passivity', their
inability 'to control conflict, and to choose between alternatives' and their ignorance 'about the
syntax of things', with the implied experimental author of Eliot's fiction (Ermarth, 80-88):
Contrasting with this laziness [of those who do not deliberate and plot] is
George Eliot's artist, pursuing a particular purpose with disciplined action. (88)
This contrast is not unreasonable. Surely, however, part of that artist's 'purpose' is to
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demonstrate the value of such individuals as do not endeavour to determine themselves by a
definite conception of the Good? One such loving and reverent individual is Lucy Deane,
whose 'nature' is explicitly said to supply her with 'no key to Tom's' in Book Six of Eliot's
novel (MF, 475). Lucy cannot comprehend Tom's prejudiced attitude towards Philip;
But to minds strongly marked by the positive and negative qualities that create
severity - strength of will, conscious rectitude of purpose, narrowness of
imagination and intellect, great power of self-control and a disposition to exert
control over others - prejudices come as the natural food of tendencies which
can get no sustenance out of the complex, fragmentary, doubt-provoking
knowledge which we call truth. (475-476)
'Severity' is the closest approximation to a Key Word that 'Eliot's artist' offers in The Mill on
the Floss. If 'Tom's sufferings' were 'quite severe' at King's Lorton, then the tables have turned
by Book Six, wherein Tom's mind itself is marked by qualities that make severity. Along with
these 'positive and negative qualities', Tom does appear to have acquired some marks of
Millean exemplarity: his newfound 'strength of will', his 'conscious rectitude of purpose' and
his 'power of self-control' overlap with the Millean originator's 'activity', 'firmness' and 'selfcontrol'. However, Eliot also highlights 'a disposition to exert control over others' and a
'narrowness of imagination and intellect' as 'qualities that create severity', and she implies that
these 'negative' qualities are often concomitant with the apparently 'positive' ones that Mill
endorses and aspires to produce. Eliot's emphasis on these being creative qualities, where what
is being created is 'severity', raises questions about Mill's conflation of Goodness, activity (as
opposed to passivity) and forceful determination. Eliot's explicit suggestion is that minds
marked by such qualities are at an epistemic disadvantage: 'prejudices come as the natural food
of [their] tendencies'.
It is fruitful to remember that, before Tom became quite so severe, those 'human sensibilities'
which 'predominated' in his moral economy were incompressible to minds 'severely regulated'
by a utilitarian impulse, the impulse to only be affected by 'attachment[s]' that 'rest on a
demonstrable superiority of qualities' (MF, 149, 160; my italics). Eliot was far more interested
than Mill was in non-demonstrable (or not-yet-fully-demonstrated) 'qualities' (mysterious
'motives', hinted as possible): her experiments occasion human qualities that fail to correspond
to any existing vocabulary, and that we should not to be too eager to subsume under moral
categories, whether previously available or freshly formed. Crucially, Eliot seems to suggest
that some of the qualities that theorists like Mill valued most highly (such as 'reasoning',
'firmness' and 'self-control') are non-commensurable with those highly-esteemed 'human
sensibilities' which The Mill on the Floss both represents through characters like Maggie and,
ideally, cultivates in the reader. As T. R. Wright concluded, in the final sentence of the section
of The Religion of Humanity committed to George Eliot's fiction, the 'Religion of Humanity'
(a notion shared by both Comte and Mill) 'gained in her work the quality of humanity.' 18
Eliot was acutely aware of the importance of questioning what manner of explanation ought to
be given to 'unspeculative minds' like Maggie Tulliver's (MF, 304). A theological explanation
such as Kempis' has its drawbacks: it encourages the inquirer to divert her attention away from
the very 'outward things' that provoked her desire for 'explanation' in the first place. Eliot's
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fiction highlights how purely scientific or philosophic explanations also have their drawbacks,
however. Throughout this article, I have suggested that Eliot's literary 'experiments'
investigate the extent to which an increase in the application of natural-scientific systems of
logic to human phenomena might provoke ethical degeneration. If - as Eliot appreciated - the
methods of investigation that Mill and Comte inaugurated were 'indispensable to any great
progress in science', then their non-interference in the conduct of art might yet also be
indispensable to the cultivation and preservation of 'right action' (364).
'To regard any theory which supplants' the logic of 'life & action' 'as having supreme
intellectual authority is a contradiction,' claimed Eliot, 'unless it could be ruled that the human
race should commit a slow suicide by the gradual extinction of motive - the poisoning of
feeling by inference' ('ML', 365). It is important to interrogate Eliot's use of that word,
'motive', which she again suggests must not be poisoned in the following sentence, a sentence
that at once unites sympathetic impulse and the scientific point of view:
Of what use is it to consider 'ends' & the motives for seeking them, unless we
can assure ourselves that the motives (or forms of force) in question will
continue to be generated? (364)
That parenthetical explication (motives are 'forms of force') provides a clue to Eliot's ethical
perspective, a perspective wherein Tom's 'sympathetic impulse' for his home is as much a
'motive' as the theory-induced desire to maximize happiness or the Postivistic desire to achieve
perfection, and the former (affective) manner of motive must not be set below, explained away
or poisoned by the latter (fully conscious) kind. Quite possibly drawing upon her knowledge
of Spinoza's Ethics, Eliot here anticipates the moral-philosophical thought of Kwame Anthony
Appiah, as recently expressed in a book entitled (tellingly) Experiments in Ethics: like Appiah
(and unlike Comte, Mill, Aristotle and Nussbaum), Eliot appears to encourage oscillation
between two very different ('but not rivalrous') perspectives, one from which 'our moral
world' appears to be 'caused' by purely natural phenomena, and another from which it appears
to be 'created' by and for the kinds of creature that we are. 19 'We need', Appiah claims, 'to
explore the relationship between the perspective of the cosmic engineer and the perspective of
the agent that she engineers; and ... we need to be able to live with both perspectives' (EIE,
120). We need to consider ethics in relation to social and psychological evolution without
allowing the art of conduct to become exclusively determined by the scientific point of view.
The two perspectives that Eliot encourages us to shift between are scientific impartiality (as
aspired towards by Comte and Mill) and anthropocentrism (as favoured by Nussbaum and
Aristotle, but also by Feuerbach and others). George Henry Lewes was similarly alive to the
need to honour both of these perspectives and - in The Principles of Success in Literature drew a fruitful distinction between the Philosopher, who attempts 'to discover and systematize
the abstract relations of things', and the Poet, who 'wishes to kindle the emotions by the
suggestion of objects themselves' .w Eliot's intuition that "Feeling is a sort of knowledge"
caused her, at least as an artist, to collapse Lewes' binary distinction however, for all of her
novels endeavour to elicit such (philosophical) knowledge about human relations as may only
be acquired by the (artful) kindling of the emotions.
The anthropocentric strand of Eliot's thought needs to be more fully explored, and a good place
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to start would be through relating Eliot's suggestion that Tom's sympathetic motives 'were
"first ideas"[,] that it was no more possible to criticize than the solidity and extension of matter'
to Aristotle's account of 'first principles', which Eliot would later employ as an epigraph in her
1870s notebook. 21 Whereas theorists like Nussbaum fully embrace Aristotle's account of first
principles, as preferable to a less human-centred 'Baconian' worldview,22 Eliot herself
ultimately only rests on this Aristotelian perspective when a more scientific view might
otherwise arrest investigation. Ultimately, for Eliot, it is possible to criticize Tom's 'first ideas'
and (though 'Feeling is a sort of knowledge') sympathetic impulses must be questioned (since,
like 'scientific' results, they too may be erroneous). Often, 'the scientific perspective' provokes
Eliot to question that notion of choice, 'as an ability that lies on the borderline between the
intellectual and the passional', that I have suggested she generally shares with Nussbaum (LK,
78). Maggie's famous ethical 'decision' is so much a product of her earlier, aesthetic
experience, for example, and so unconscious (or minimally intellectual) that it is debatable
whether it is, in fact, a 'choice':
Maggie was not conscious of a decision as she turned away from
[Stephen's] ... gloomy averted face - and walked out of the room: it was like an
automatic action that fulfils a forgotten intention. (500)

*
Suzy Anger has highlighted that Eliot noted the following 'in a late letter': '"the most thorough
experimentalists admit intuition - i.e. direct impressions/sensibility underlying all proof - as
necessary starting points for thought" (GEL, VI: 167)' (Anger, 85). My own hypothesis is that
Eliot is here referring to Claude Bernard, who influenced both the Leweses and who explicitly
asserted - in An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine - that 'Intuition or Feeling
Begets the Experimental Idea' .23 Clearly, Bernard's sense of the 'spontaneous' and 'individual'
nature of the inauguration of every experimental process is richer and more in line with Eliot's
sensibility than either Comte's or Mill's theories of scientific conduct, but it is crucial to
acknowledge the limitations of even Bernard's theory as a potential Key to Eliot's art of literary
experimentation. Whereas Bernard held that 'no experimenter may depart' from 'the definite
precepts and precise rules of logic' once experimentation is underway, Eliot's occasional
anthropocentrism and her sense that 'Feeling is a sort of knowledge' seem to afford a far more
pervasive role to the non-systematic and the emotive at every stage of the heuristic endeavour
(ISEM, 33). That Bernard's theory only gets us so far, however, completely accords with his
own idea that '[w]hen we propound a general theory in our sciences, we are sure only that,
literally speaking, all such theories are false' (35).
Neither Eliot nor Bernard confessed or promoted relativism, and both figures' emphases on the
need for 'doubt', on the 'provisional' nature of all knowledge and on - in Bernard's words the 'fundamental precept' of 'non-submission to authority' were firmly grounded by their
intuition that epistemic error is possible, indeed unavoidable, and yet partially preventable (3536, 41). Eliot's sense that every master Key is ultimately only a clue is inseparable from her
sense that we are always in need of restoring our 'stores of motive', and of re-learning to know
or really learning to feel what we know. Neither Maggie nor Marian ever ceased to see and to
explore the possibility (possibilities and tragic impossibilities) of shifting the position from
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which one looks at human motives. For both, it remained irrevocably wrong to let go the clue
to life - that clue which once, in far off years, young need clutched so strongly.
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